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BuiRu's interest in political change, its uncertain course and even more
uncertain consequences, gives his writings their present relevance and accounts
for the continuing appearance of critical studies and republications of his
works. This pervasive theme of political change is reflected in his many dis-
cussions of the relation between theory and practice, his evaluation of the
relative merits of abstract knowledge and experience, and his eulogy of the
not easily defined quality of prudence. It is thus not surprising to find that
interest in Burke is at its peak when the risk of change is greatest, as during
the Reform Bill crisis of 1831-1832. or, indeed, as during recent decades,
which have faced the threat of a new jacobinism. Yet Burke's reflections and
warnings about overconfident and careless tampering with social arrangements
have immediacy at all times for those who are especially sensitive to latent
crises and the vulnerability of the complex institutional fabric, and for those
who fear that small changes carry implications of potentially dire conse-
quences. It is for this reason that Burke stands as the dominant figure in
the conservative tradition.
The matter cannot rest at that, however, for Burke in his own time and
since has appeared somewhat enigmatic. He was a conservative, but opposed
the King's party; he defended the underdog-the abused colonists, the Cath-
olics in Ireland, the victims of misrule in India-and shared what at the time
were the heterodox economic views of Adam Smith. He was a traditionalist
but also a reformer. He attacked one revolution but defended another. While
such variations in a political position are unusual, they need not, and in
Burke's case do not, indicate inconsistency. The questions they raise never-
theless create an uncertainty regarding Burke's fundamental intellectual and
political position-an uncertainty which Peter Stanlis in his scholarly yet
tendentious book attempts to remove by setting out what in his opinion con-
stitutes the ultimate theoretical foundation of Burke's political thinking.
In so doing, Stanlis focuses on an aspect of Burke's thought that has been
often neglected because of Burke's emphasis on the practical. Burke attacked
theory and extolled practice as if they were incompatible. He insisted, more-
over, that theory had no part to play in politics and attacked theorists as
metaphysicians, speculatists, theological politicians. A number of his memo-
rable maxims counseled that political conduct be guided by moderation and
prudence, that political judgments be founded more upon the circumstances
of a particular case than upon general principles, and that political wisdom
be sought, not in individual speculation, but in established practice and tradi-
tion. So emphatic were Burke's pronouncements that some writers concluded
that because he opposed theorizing, he was without any theory of his own.
Still, Burke must have looked to ultimate principles; so at least it would
seem if one considers how little guidance is offered by such concepts as
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prudence, utility, and precedent, when examined in isolation. Without refer-
ence to an underlying doctrine, these concepts would leave the ship of state
quite rudderless, and Burke was hardly one to allow this. He himself said
that he did "not vilify theory and speculation-no, because that would be to
vilify reason itself .... ['\V]henever I speak against theory, I mean always
a weak, erroneous, fallacious, unfounded or imperfect theory . ..."'
Stanlis argues not only that Burke had fundamental principles but that they
can be traced to the traditional natural law doctrine, both classical and scho-
lastic, as found in Aristotle, Cicero, Thomas, and Hooker. According to the
author, the natural law philosophy was the ultimate source of Burke's be-
liefs-his political convictions reflected its ethical norms and he "consistently
appealed" to it and "sought to establish" its principles through practical
political action.2 This "higher law" was, in essence, an eternal and universal
ethical norm emanating from God, apprehended through man's reason, and
valid at all times and in all circumstances, independently of man's will. While
positive law could vary with the particular needs and circumstances of a
political community, its validity depended on its consistency with the law of
nature.
This general philosophy, though its formulations and emphasis varied, has
been a pillar of much of the ethical inquiry throughout Western history-
until the modem era. With Hobbes it faced direct attack, and since the seven-
teenth century, though it has by no means been abandoned, its foundations
have been increasingly undermined. While appeals to nature and its laws
were very common during the eighteenth century, the natural law concept
had become confused and vague, a situation that allowed for its eventual dis-
tortion in the theories of abstract natural rights. It was this distorted version
of the traditional meaning that Burke attacked and that led Bentham, writing
while Burke was still alive, -to deny the existence of natural law and to brand
it as a fiction producing only confusion. Stanlis interprets Burke as having
resisted the agnostic and scientific currents of the enlightenment that contri-
buted to the undermining of belief in the traditional law of nature; and he
sees Burke as upholding the essential features of the original position. This
basis of Burke's thought has been ignored, he says, because the utilitarian and
positivist critics who have dominated discussion of these matters have assumed
that, because Burke opposed the doctrine of abstract natural rights along with
all speculative theories, he rejected the entire natural law doctrine as a theo-
retical position. But, Stanlis shows, they thereby failed to distinguish the doc-
trine of man's abstract natural right, derived from a hypothetical state of
1. 3 BuRKE, SPEEcEs 48 (1816). [The date of the speech is misprinted in Stanlis,
p. 129, as June 16, 1789; it should be 1784.]
2. Pp. xi, 40. Stanlis' descriptions vary in emphasis; occasionally they are moderate,
as when he simply says that Burke was "in" the natural law tradition, p. xi, or that he
"belonged to" it. At other times, however, his language reveals more ambitious claims,
as in the passages quoted in text, or where he asserts that Burke "ala'ays appealed to th
Natural Law." P. 83.
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nature, from the ethical norms of the law of nature which included the "real
rights" underlying Burke's beliefs.3
To demonstrate his thesis, Stanlis points out that Burke was intimately
acquainted with the literature of the natural law tradition. Burke had, of
course, read many of the classics of ancient political philosophy and, in addi-
tion, was familiar with the writings of Coke and Grotius, among other jurists
and constitutional historians. His interest in these latter writers stemmed in
part from his having studied law (he was registered at the Middle Temple)
and also from his extensive reviewing of legal works for the Annual Register,
of which he had been editor.4 Although he had not completed his legal train-
ing, it had served to give him a respect for the English common law (if not
always for lawyers), which, even if it was not formulated in the language of
the natural law, was nourished by the ideas and values of that tradition.
The author's case rests, however, not on Burke's familiarity with natural
law doctrine, but on an attempt to show that the principles of natural law
played an important part in the formation of Burke's judgments and in the
arguments he used in support of them. He approaches this task in two ways.
Stanlis first examines Burke's position on particular events and issues that
provided an occasion for appeal to basic principles-most notably the question
of English rule in Ireland, dealings with the American colonies, Indian affairs,
the French Revolution, and various domestic controversies. Secondly, he con-
siders topics of critical importance in the theory of natural law, such as the
law of nations, the problem of rights and the relation of church and state, and
by drawing on Burke to provide illustrations of the natural law position,
seeks to establish its major influence on him. Thus, he is able to show that
Burke often appealed to a "higher law," divine in its origin and hence eter-
nal, moral in character and binding on all men regardless of nationality or
status--on kings and governors-general as well as on peoples and parliaments.
Human laws were to be merely declaratory of the original justice of higher
moral law. It was this law of nature that provided a distinction between
power and moral right-and Burke does indeed appeal to it on certain oc-
casions.
Unlike those commentaries which assume that Burke simply accepted the
3. Pp. 29-31, 83. For Burke on "real rights," see his Reflections on the Revolttion in
France, in 3 THE WORKS OF EDMUND BURKE 303 (Nimmo ed. 1887). Although Stanlis
is on the whole correct in his analysis of the failure of utilitarian critics to recognize the
natural law ingredient in Burke's thinking, there are exceptions, the most notable among
them being James Fitzjames Stephen. By both his own account and his brother's,
Stephen was a utilitarian, though not an orthodox one; yet he wrote that a "notion of a
justice antecedent to, and by right formative of, all law, and made binding on all men
by an immutable divine decree, lies at the root of every part of Burke's political theories."
J. F. STF'HEN, Burke on tie French Revoltiton, in 3 HoRaE SABBATICAE 142, 140-44
(1892) ; L. STEPHEN, LIFE OF SIR JAMES FI'ZJAMiES STEPHEN 116, 123, 230, 299, 31.7, 321,
328, 334-37 (2d ed. 1895).
4. Among the books he had reviewed were Blackstone's Discourses and Commentaries
and Beccaria's Essay. See pp. 35-40.
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historically established values of his society and his party, Stanlis' book has
the merit of recognizing that to call Burke a traditionalist or a conservative
utilitarian is not sufficient-that the origin of Burke's principles is more varied.
In looking to natural law, Stanlis focuses on one important source of Burke's
beliefs. The author's view that this concept provides the key to an under-
standing of all of Burke's writings requires serious qualification, however, for
the evidence is ambiguous at best. Although Burke's thinking reflects the
traditional natural law, that its principles were the exclusive source of his
judgments and arguments is far from clear, for he sometimes appealed to his-
tory, tradition, experience, and precedent as if they were the final source of
his principles. Such appeals are typical of his discussion of domestic issues
like the royal prerogative, the powers of Parliament, or parliamentary reform;
whereas direct and explicit references to a higher, eternal natural law are
more characteristic of his treatments of Ireland, of Hastings in India,r and of
Jacobinism.6 In discussing the British Constitution, for example, he seems to
discern the relevant principles in the historical experience of a settled political
community. In this context, at least, "theories ought to be found on experi-
ence, and instead of adapting the constitution to a theory, the theory [ought
to] ... grow out of the constitution."'7 This theory was to be found "in our
histories, in our records, in our acts of Parliament and journals of Parlia-
ment"; he further pointed out that Coke and Blackstone were "industrious
to prove the pedigree of our liberties." Although Stanlis is most sensitive to
5. In passing, it should be noted that while the impeachment of Hastings was the
occasion for some of Burke's most pronounced statements about the authority of natural
law, Stanlis is much too uncritical in his assumption of the accuracy and justice of Burke's
charges and the propriety of Burke's conduct. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen said of the
indictment, for which Burke had been responsible, that it was equivocal and vague, full
of invective and insinuations, and that it covered by its "profusion of irrelevant matter,
the total and no doubt designed absence of averments essential to the conclusion which
they are meant to support." Concerning Burke's accusation that Hastings, in order to pro-
tect his own reputation, had conspired with a judge. Sir Elijah Impey, to bring about the
judicial murder of one Nuncomar. "a jury would be properly directed to acquit." Burke
was censured by the House of Commons for making this particular accusation. 1 J. F.
STEPHEN, THE STORY OF NUNCOMAR AND THE IMPEACHMENT OF SiR ELIJAH IMPEY
68-69, 74 (1885); 2 id. at 8-9, 113; L. STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 433; see 3
CHURCHILL, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH SPEAKING PEOPLES 187 (1957) ("posterity has
redeemed his [Hastings'] name from the slurs of the Whigs") ; FELING, WAaRE HAST-
INGS 354-57, 367 (1954).
6. Stanlis, himself, at p. 83, distinguishes between these txvo types of situations, in-
dicating that where "the state itself was corrupted from its true function, and became
the instrument of arbitrary tyranny and injustice" Burke's appeals became explicit, while
in other cases he "was content to fulfill the Natural Law indirectly." Yet on the same
page the author states that "in every important political problem he ever faced, in Irish,
American, constitutional, economic, Indian, and French affairs, Burke always appealed
to the Natural Law."
7. 4 BURKE, SPEECHES 49 (1816).
8. BRKE, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in 3 THE WORKS OF EDMUND
BURKE 271-72 (Nimmo ed. 1887).
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this aspect of Burke's thinking, he does not accept as significant the distinc-
tion between natural law and history or tradition. The British Constitution,
he argues, is not only in harmony with natural law but is "derived" 9 from it;
thus, to seek political norms in constitutional experience and practice is really
to derive them from natural law. The civil rights of Englishmen, while es-
tablished in custom and discovered by examining precedents, are in fact "de-
rivative rights," 10 taken from that eternal higher law which defines the true
rights of all men.
That the natural law tradition played an important part in the thinking of
the great commentators on the common law is undoubtedly true; and it is
equally true that the supremacy of law and the idea that power is a trust, like
other fundamental constitutional principles, find a sanction in natural law doc-
trine. But, while the constitution Burke extolled did not violate the natural
law, his words do not always suggest that he believed constitutional principles
and civil rights to be derived from it or to depend upon it for their validity.
In the unnatural circumstances of an India suffering from anarchy and arbi-
trary rule, or an Ireland under the Popery Laws, or France under the Jaco-
bins-where a nation was broken up into "nmoleculae of a disbanded people,""
with tradition abandoned or destroyed-Burke did judge by the simple, gener-
al standards of the natural law position. But in "ancient organized states' 1 2
like England, enjoying a constitution that had developed slowly under con-
ditions of stability and historical continuity, tradition was not merely a reflec-
tion of philosophy but a substitute for it. Thus he observed that English
liberties, from Magna Carta to the Declaration of Rights, were "ar entailed
inleritance derived to us from our forefathers... an estate specially belonging
to the people of this kingdom, without any reference whatever to any other
more general or prior rights."'13
When Stanlis argues that Burke's extraction of normative political stan-
dards from constitutional history and tradition really means that Burke is
deriving his principles from natural law, he claims too much not only for
Burke, but also for the natural law. According to that position, knowledge
of the moral law is accessible to man through his reason; and, while natural
law may be reflected in custom and tradition, its validity is independent of
historical experience. To the extent that Burke derived his principles from
tradition and history, his reliance on natural law loses the critical importance
that Stanlis attaches to it. Much of Burke's traditionalism with respect to the
British Constitution is an expression of the same attitude or quality of tem-
perament that made him a Whig constitutionalist, and by the eighteenth cen-
tury that was largely a nonphilosophic position. This constitutionalism, it is
9. P. 54.
10. Pp. 74, 77.
11. Bu=uE, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in 3 TiE WoRKs OF EDmUND
BURKE 259 (Ninmo ed. 1887).
12. Ibid.
13. Id. at 274.
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true, had been influenced by natural law ideas, and it provided Burke with
some of his fundamental principles, but it had also come to incorporate a dis-
trust of claims to theoretical knowledge.
In essence, then, Burke's position is mixed. He certainly reflects more
strongly than most of his contemporaries the substance of the old religious and
philosophical tradition-as Stanlis abundantly demonstrates. But he was also
a politician, and many of his beliefs, while they may be traceable to funda-
mental principles, seem to have been related in Burke's thinking to unarticulated
principles that lived, so to speak, in his fingertips, with the logical connecting
lines to ultimate theory neither conscious nor clearly drawn. Stanlis draws
in those lines, and in doing so makes Burke a more orthodox representative
of natural law than the ambiguous evidence justifies.
What seems to be an exaggerated statement of the case is perhaps a result
of the author's dual purpose in this book; for in addition to his analysis of
Burke, he has written an exposition of natural law and made a plea, which
becomes explicit at the end of the volume, in its behalf. His zeal for the
natural law position causes oversimplification in his observations on post-
Burkian political thought, which the author roughly labels "utilitarian-positiv-
ist." Stanlis is led to consider utilitarianism generally in order to explain
why "utilitarian-positivist scholarship," as represented by such men as John
Morley and Henry Buckle, failed to appreciate the contribution of natural law
ideas to Burke's thinking. Because of the great emphasis he places on the
theoretical importance of natural law, however, he establishes too narrow a
conception of "utilitarianism" and tends to assume that all who stand outside
the natural law fold share much the same views-that is, the same errors.
Thus Burke's contemporary critics, like Paine, Price, and Priestly, are lumped
together with Bentham, Mill, Morley, and Leslie Stephen. Such imprecise
grouping produces small but significant errors. Stanlis says, for example,
that Mackintosh, as a utilitarian, wished to reform Parliament so that repre-
sentation would be based on numbers-a position Mackintosh clearly op-
posed. 14
Stanlis also sees too sharp a cleavage between utilitarians and Burke,
and this has a more serious consequence. Sharp division is in fact to be
found, but only in the restricted realm of theory. If instead of looking ex-
clusively to the philosophical and religious realm, which emphasizes only
the differences between utilitarians and Burke, the author had considered the
practical judgments and general political thought of nineteenth-century liberal
Whiggism, which had a close intellectual affinity and practical political al-
14. Contrast Stanlis, p. 303, to Universal Suffrage, 31 EDINBURGH REv. 165, 186
(1818) (anonymously published), wherein Mackintosh asserts that "if representation ie
proportioned to numbers alone, every other interest in society is placed at the disposal of
the multitude. . . . [N]o other class can have a political security for justice; no other
can have any weight in the deliberations of the Legislature. No talents, no attainments,
but such as recommend men to the favour of the multitude, can have any admission into
it." See also id. at 175-77, 182, 184-85, 192.
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liance with utilitarianism, a less distorted picture of the political thought of
the period could have been presented. For example, Brougham and Macaulay,
while both Whigs, expressed great esteem for Bentham's legal philosophy,
which was based on the most extreme form of utilitarianism; yet, during the
Reform Bill crisis, the spirit of Burke breathed in them; and it was certainly
from Burke above all others that they and their colleagues learned the import-
ance of proceeding empirically, of distrusting abstract theorists (whether Tory
or Radical), and of allowing for changes within the context of traditional
principles. Burke's maxim that "a state without the means of some change is
without the means of its conservation" is a perfect statement of the rationale
for the Reform Bill defended by the Whig-utilitarians of 1832. It was this
spirit of Burkian prudence that led them to make small changes in order to
avoid a revolution, and which allowed the British Constitution to survive.
For this reason Burke was widely admired among utilitarians and Whigs-
as Stanlis acknowledges at the end of his book-so much so, in fact, that Lord
Acton could say of these men that they lived "on fragments that fell from
his table. ... Brougham and Lowe lived by the vitality of his ideas. Mackin-
tosh and Macaulay are only Burke trimmed and stripped of all that touched
the skies."'"
The question therefore arises whether much of nineteenth-century utilitarian
thinking did not in one sense reflect a Burkian tradition. There is, it would
appear, some continuity with Burke, along with the disjunction that Stanlis
emphasizes, indeed exaggerates, by condemning the "utilitarian-positivists,"
not because they failed to admire Burke, but because they admired him for
inadequate reasons. Stanlis looks to philosophy and religion when in fact
Burkian ideas lived in the realm of practical politics as part of a rich tradition
that nourished the mode of thinking of politicians and publicists functioning
in a viable political system. Hence, Brougham or Macaulay, like Morley, could
think of himself as a "Burkian and a Benthamite." 16
The conclusion the author draws from his study requires one final com-
ment. In looking for a revival of the natural law, he speaks of our "contem-
porary need" for Burke. In one important sense that need does and always
will exist, so long as it is necessary to protect the institutional framework of
15. DREw, AcroN, GLADSTONE AND OTHERS 8 (1924). Acton also wrote: "For half
a century after Burke's death our political writers lived on his ideas, Canning on one
side, Brougham on the other, Mackintosh, successively, on both sides, Macaulay wavering
between them." FASNAcHT, LORD ACTON ON NATIONALITY AND SOCIALIsm 31 (1949).
16. 2 HIRsT, EAR.Y LIFE & LETrTms OF JonN MoRLEY 211. (1927); see Stanlis, p.
30, Macaulay called Burke "the greatest man since Milton," Stanlis, p. 246; yet-not-
withstanding his attack on the utilitarian theory of government-he also thought of him-
self as a disciple of Bentham's legal philosophy. DHARKER, LORD MAcAuLAY's LEGISLATIVE
MINUTES 140, 214 (1946). Admittedly, Brougham was not sparing in his criticisms of
both men; still, some importance attends the fact that he could state, "enlightened men
in all ages will hang over the words of Burke," Stanlis, p. 247, and also collaborate with
Bentham in designing legal reforms and publish a eulogy of him acknowledging his
"first place among Legal Philosophers," 2 BROUGHAM, SPEECHEs 290 et pcassim (183).
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society from the doctrinaire advocates of a theory or design, according to
which government is to be recast. This consideration makes "conservatives"
of all responsible men. At the same time. notice may be taken of the truism
that a people is fortunate when its political system can operate within a com-
munity in which there is a sufficient measure of agreement on fundamentals
to allow for free discussion and democratic choice without the risk of a revolu-
tion. While the continuity and the attachment to fundamental constitutional
practices that such a condition evidences have been appreciated by many be-
sides Burke, few have made this consideration so central to their thinking.
All but extreme parties and dissident minorities have learned this much from
Burke, and to this extent it is our good fortune that no "contemporary need"
for him exists. To insist that we ought also to proclaim the religious and philo-
sophical underpinning that provided the background to, and in part supported,
Burke's convictions is to reveal an exaggerated sense of the danger from con-
temporary Jacobinism. The plea, moreover, ignores the considerable moral
commitment to the political order (many aspects of which would evoke Burke's
approval), despite the diminution of religious belief and the weakening of the
classical philosophical tradition.
Believing that there is a present need to reaffirm natural law principles, the
author seeks to portray Burke as a "true conservative" and to deny the "claims
of utilitarian critics that Burke belongs to their camp" ;17 this, in view of the
general and tacit acceptance of many Burkian ideas, is an immoderate aim of
which Burke would surely have disapproved.
JOSEPn HAMBURGERt
17. Pp. 120-21, 167.
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